Considering the history of language and meaning, ‘Mahfil’ (often spelled as ‘Majlish’ or ‘Mafil’) could originally mean any gathering. We could call any public declaration by someone in a gathering a ‘Mahfil’. However, in Bangladesh, the meaning of ‘Mahfil’ has been restricted to only gatherings for Islamic discourses. Similarly, the original broad, literary meaning of ‘Ghazal’ has been narrowed in Bengali. The literary tradition from which ‘Ghazal’ comes defines it as the poetic expression of an individual’s deep inner feelings, often with a sense of melancholy, frequently concerning love and separation, and sometimes about the profound mystical truths of life. But in Bengali now, ‘Ghazal’ simply means an Islamic song.
Well, that is just how language is. So, in those Mahfils, one thing I particularly like is when the preacher/speaker, after presenting his discourse on a matter, asks the attendees, “Is that right? Why don’t you speak up?” The gathered crowd then yells out, “Right! Right!”
With a sharp eye, one can see that this event is essentially an election by voice vote, similar to what happens in a general democratic parliament! By participating in such an election, the speaker actually chooses a side in a debate that has been going on for nearly 2500 years. This debate is still ongoing, and it is: How do we resolve the possible conflict between Ilm (Knowledge/Truth) and popular vote? Did the speaker in that Mahfil, then, side with the popular vote? If the gathered audience had shouted, “Wrong! Wrong!”, would the Truth or Ilm have become false? Religious people would face the biggest dilemma here, because for them, Truth/Ilm is a divine matter, and whether people vote for it or not does not matter, because God and His Ilm are the Truth that existed even before the beginning of time and will remain after time ends—He exists beforehand—before time itself—and everything else comes into being, remains, or ceases to be by His command: Kun faya kun (Be, and it is).
So, what did that speaker do? Did he make Ilm/Truth/God relative?
Actually, no. Rather, he accepted himself as human, and accepted Ilm or Truth as such a divine matter that a human is not meant to fully attain. Claiming otherwise is to equate oneself with God (Shirk), and he thus saved himself from that association.
Truth or Ilm is not relative, but the extent of human knowledge is relative. Therefore, what humans declare to be Truth/Ilm becomes relative. Consequently, the choice of which Truth/Ilm humans will adopt for their actions at any historical moment is also relative. So, how will a society or state choose which Truth/Ilm to accept as Truth/Ilm? What is the way?
When neither can be claimed as ultimate/absolute—or at least we don’t know—but one must be chosen for our lives to proceed, then we need a process, a methodology for choosing. And here, the sign of wisdom could be this: We will choose the one by which the fewest people will be negatively affected—that will be our policy for action. And when we start working with the chosen policy, we might find that our calculation was wrong, and actually, the majority of people are being negatively affected! Because of this possibility of error, and precisely because we are not the all-knowing God (to avoid Shirk), the policy needs to be short-term or term-bound!
Thus, because human knowledge is limited, the process of creating a term-bound policy instead of an absolute policy (which would be Shirk) is called Election. Election—because through it, we can calculate which policy has the highest chance of negatively affecting the fewest people! This is why a policy can be elected even with less than 50% of the vote, because the other policies have the potential to negatively affect even more people. We often see an objection regarding an elected person: that the majority of people don’t want him, yet he is the ruler! This happens because the others are wanted by even fewer people! Therefore, being elected is not about being the choice of the majority, but rather the least unwanted choice!
The modern form of election we know is often viewed by political thinkers as a very Western, modern phenomenon. So, when a speaker in a Mahfil holds an instant election, will the proponents of Islam criticize him? Is he practicing the ideas of infidels and atheists?
Those who work on Islamism in modern state politics likely dislike most modern elections and democracy. The idea of ‘Taghuti Rule’ (Rule of the Tyrant/Non-Divine) is quite prevalent among Islamic political thinkers, it seems.
The fundamental indicator for recognizing Taghut often comes down to the question of sovereignty right from the start. They view the sovereignty of the state’s people in liberal democracy as a challenge to the sovereignty of God, thus leading to Shirk. This question needs our examination.
To view the idea of popular sovereignty in democracy as a challenge to God’s sovereignty, democracy must be considered a total philosophy, a religion, a doctrine for human life. But democracy is merely a methodology, just a process for resolving worldly disputes in life, a way to maintain the peace treaty among the state’s many groups, to prevent conflict from escalating into civil war—choosing peace instead of civil war as a method of resolution.
Almost all states in the world are theist; they have an idea of a national religion, and yet they are democratic. The American dollar says, ‘In God We Trust’; almost all states in Europe and America, with a few exceptions, have Christianity as their national religion; India has Hinduism, and Bangladesh has Islam. This does not prevent any of them from being democratic.
In a democratic state, popular sovereignty is the order of how power will function in the state, whose jurisdiction will be over whom—the chain of command. How do we find the interpretation of God’s sovereignty in the world? Popular sovereignty is the applied form of God’s sovereignty. If the authority for the worldly interpretation and practice of God’s sovereignty falls into the hands of one or two individuals, it is then that they try to replace God, becoming Taghut, like Nimrod. That is why, instead of entrusting it to a few, the idea of collective popular will emerged as the way for God’s sovereignty to be present in the world!
Going to a much smaller level might clarify the matter slightly. Suppose you are the owner of a plot of land or a date orchard—what does this mean? The Prophet and the Companions were also owners; Hazrat Uthman was also quite wealthy. This idea of ownership is entirely worldly, or God granted them this ownership in the world; your wealth is God’s wealth, for everything belongs to God. You have been entrusted with worldly authority; the duty and authority for the worldly guardianship of God’s ownership lie with you.
This ownership, the transfer of ownership, and the state’s laws—this entire system is actually based on divine decree! The foundation of our moral code is religion; there is no foundation for justice and morality without a superior power, and the state’s laws are a term-bound peace treaty among those many theisms and moralities, a covenant. This is why disputes should be resolved under the purview of state law and the justice system, rather than the moral supervision of small powers in society. The peace treaty of many religious moral codes is endangered when one moral code exerts dominance; that is an act of coercion, a violation of the fundamental peace treaty.
So, the sovereignty of democracy, in the sense of the collective popular will, does not replace God’s sovereignty; rather, it is the method of divine sovereignty’s worldly application—the organizational chart of state power—and thus, it does not violate the reality of God.
Many Islamic thinkers likely see this popular sovereignty as a challenge to God’s sovereignty, as Shirk, and thus, in their view, it is a Taghuti phenomenon. Among these Islamic thinkers, Hazarat Maududi is probably the most interesting. Many thinkers from various sides dislike him, but his political doctrine is still alive; his legacy/chain of thought has a politics that is ongoing in India-Pakistan-Bangladesh.
In a sense, Hazarat Maududi’s work is post-colonial. Anti-colonial thinkers may dislike him, and those who fully accept the colonial reality also dislike him. If we pay attention, we will realize that the Muslim League, which emerged in 1906, created an opportunity for Muslims to enter the modern European political system; but that was only the cultural presence of Muslims in the modern political arena, not Islamism—we do not find any alternative political doctrine in the Muslim League. Conversely, Hazarat Maududi presents Islamism as a political doctrine opposite to modern Europe. The result is this: the anti-colonial Islamists accuse Maududi of acting as a broker to make Islam compatible with European thought; conversely, the proponents of colonial thought accuse him of denying modernity!
But Hazarat Maududi’s ‘Theo-Democracy’ is actually neither; it is a post-colonial political doctrine from the ground of Islam. He presents a resolution to the question of sovereignty through the name ‘Theo-Democracy’. And in my estimation, the closest image of Maududi’s dream state can be found in Khomeini’s Iran!
However, it must be noted that the Iranian revolution did not happen on the path shown by Maududi; Hazarat Maududi advised seizing power through election in an ideal democratic situation, and he practiced politics with that possibility. In this regard, the Muslim Brotherhood’s assumption of power in Egypt can perhaps be considered Maududi’s greatest political success.
I interpret Hazarat Maududi’s thought in this way: First, it must be said that Maududi likely got the inspiration for creating his alternative political doctrine from Marx. Conversely, the fact that modern Marxism is now willing to join liberal democracy and practice politics with the possibility of seizing power might also be pioneered by Maududi, or at least I suspect Hazarat Maududi’s influence is present!
So, many Islamic thinkers, Maududi, and Marx—for all of them, modern liberal democracy is likely ‘Taghuti Rule’. Many modern Marxists and Hazarat Maududi’s doctrine dream of overthrowing that Taghut by joining that very Taghuti system!
Thus, Hazarat Maududi and this modern Marxism are joining a political process, in the dream of seizing power, which is practically forbidden by their philosophical/moral principles. Meaning, the process through which they dream of seizing power, they may not uphold after the seizure. I call this ‘The Politics of Pretext.’
But Marxism does not discuss this matter much, and perhaps they don’t see the need to inform the public; however, Hazarat Maududi would likely call this wisdom (Hikmah), and as justification for the moral permissibility of this Politics of Pretext, he would cite the context of fighting against Taghut.
And why is a pretext needed in the fight against Taghut? Why can’t it be resolved by direct force? Because of modern reality—war technology, modern weaponry, the efficiency of the modern state in killing. This realization of reality was likely solidified in 1857, where the failure of the Sepoy Revolt in British India deeply imprinted this idea on the collective mind of societies and cultures outside Europe.
This means it cannot be done by force. However, one might bring up the examples of Russia and China here; if we pay attention, we will see that in those two incidents, the state was still technologically weak, and the upheaval of the two World Wars created the historical opportunity/leeway for those events. However, many do not agree with Maududi’s thinking about the inability to use force, or they haven’t delved into it; hence, some have walked a certain distance on Hazarat Maududi’s path and created political methodologies like Bangladesh’s ‘Hizbut Tahrir’.
So, we find two reasons for the Politics of Pretext:
The extraordinary power of the modern state.
Modern democracy is Taghuti rule, and it must be overthrown.
There is not much to discuss about point ‘1’; that is true—such elaborate arrangements for killing, such precise killing from a secure distance, had not existed in any previous era of history!
Our discussion is about point ‘2’—Should we call modern democracy Taghuti rule? Or, does an alternative political doctrine, originating from Islamic thought, necessarily have to view modern democracy as Taghuti rule? Or, even if there are many major conflicts, can’t those problems be eased in an Islamic (peaceful) manner? That is, the ultimate question is, Is the Politics of Pretext essential/a must?
If we compare the many methods/thoughts/doctrines of rule throughout history, we will see that the distance of modern democracy from classical Islamic rule is much less than its distance from the monarchy of Europe or the rest of the world!
If we consider the state that emerged under the leadership of the Prophet in Medina as the first Islamic state, it is immediately noticeable that the Prophet did not seize Medina; he was invited—he was invited to be the ruler of Medina.
This invitation and acceptance of the invitation is a fundamental formula of Islam and the Prophet. Asking for an invitation on a matter, preaching and advising why it is necessary, obtaining the acceptance of the people or the system of voting or taking Bay’ah (oath of allegiance)—this is thus using the Prophet’s method. Even the idea of creating a state through a social contract among citizens and establishing a foundational document, which we find in Rousseau, is likely to have been influenced by the Medina Charter/Covenant/Proclamation under the Prophet’s leadership. Even the rule in modern elections that a candidate must be proposed by another person can be found in the event where the Prophet was invited to Medina, or after the Prophet’s passing, when Hazrat Abu Bakar and Hazrat Omar proposed each other’s names in the assembly of the Ansar!
Without offense, I would like to say two more things here: There is a discussion among Muslims today about taking action against ‘Shātime Rasūl’ (those who insult the Prophet), and sometimes it is quite strict. We will notice that when the Prophet was the head of the community/state of Medina, Shātime Rasūl meant a crime against the community/state (Sedition). Medina was then in a continuous state of war with Mecca, so the state could not leave an act that demoralized the members of the Medinan community unpunished. Even in modern states, Sedition is a major crime, and capital punishment can be applied. This means that action against Shātime Rasūl then must be understood as a case of sedition, which is no longer applicable. And with this reasoning, we can understand why the Prophet, before the Hijra (migration), prayed for the guidance of those who insulted him in Mecca instead of taking any action.
However, it should also be noted that, according to an Azhari scholar, there were some executions in Mecca after the return, for various crimes, including ‘Shātime Rasūl,’ and there are also instances of people being pardoned after repenting and writing poetry in praise of the Prophet. Overall, there are not few precedents against the idea of an obligation to kill ‘Shātime Rasūl.’ Conversely, in a state, both acts could be crimes, and then it is likely more judicious to complain to the state instead of taking the law into one’s own hands. And when someone takes the law into their own hands, the state has no choice but to take action, as it automatically constitutes an attack on the state’s authority. Another aspect should perhaps be considered here: Even if you feel action should be taken, will you take action yourself, or just invite others to take action? I mean, killing and propagating killing are two different things; even if you can provide evidence for killing, what evidence do you have for the propagation of killing!? At least we must agree on one point: everyone will perform their duty. If you feel that killing is necessary and you kill, or perform your duty by propagating killing, then the state/law will also perform its duty—the state/law will treat killing and the propagation of killing as a punishable act and mete out punishment. However, the resulting disruption of peace in society and the state is difficult to consider a positive event or one consistent with the spirit of Islam!
Okay, let’s return to our main discussion; among the other similarities with liberal democracy, we will find the idea of Common Law, where equal dignity is allotted to citizens, which is the conventional/textbook reference point of liberal democracy and is not found in the Greek-Roman political systems.
But these similarities and differences are actually external—technical or methodological. We need to decide on the core meaning—does democracy, through election/voting, establish majoritarian Taghuti rule, or does democracy give less respect to God/Truth/Ilm compared to coercion? As far as I know, some have also raised this caution regarding Greek-Roman democracy.
In this regard, we should first note that voting has been present in all eras of the world, but there were differences in who the voters would be and who could vote. The claim that humans have the authority to make the final decision regarding Ilm or Truth/Reality contains a Taghuti element, which is perhaps why, even in the courts of Muslim rulers, there was a form of voting among the scholars (Ulama) themselves to decide which of the various Fatwas (religious rulings) would be chosen! And the Fatwa that was accepted by more scholars was taken as policy, which a new community of scholars in a new era could later change through a new vote. This means that different things are perhaps considered Ilm or Truth at different times! But we must note that this is not because there are many Truths/Realities, but because of the limits of human knowledge and to prevent humans from claiming to be God and becoming Taghut, one is chosen as the possible Truth/Ilm/Reality at a certain time/era, and precisely because it is a possible Truth, the matter is not permanent but term-bound—it is less a decision or claim that ‘this is the true Ilm,’ and more of a covenant of truth, an establishment of a momentary truth in that historical moment.
This means voting and Truth/Ilm are not antagonists at all; they do not have an agenda to negate each other; there is no conflict between them. Rather, voting happens out of the desire not to be a Taghuti association, and it is a strategy to increase the probability of recognizing/choosing the true Ilm by garnering the votes of more people/scholars.
Now the question is, does the dignity of Ilm diminish if participation in this voting/election is general? Here we must consider: In the matter of rule, when creating a policy, why is a consensus through voting deemed necessary to temporarily establish a certain idea as the true Ilm, and why is there even a need for it?
Because a problem (of any kind) has emerged in history, and a resolution must be made, and since humans do not have the means for a correct divine resolution, the Fatwa that is most likely to negatively affect the fewest people is taken as the possible true Ilm. This means there is a core value: alongside maximizing the probability of it being the true Ilm, the possible harm to people is also minimized. There is also another matter here—the pact of justice must also be fulfilled.
We can thus find three purposes/goals for a Fatwa/Ilm/Policy: Maximizing the probability of correctness, Justice, and Minimizing the probability of the greatest harm. In an election, therefore, three types of people vote for these three targets—scholars vote based on logical merit, and beyond that, possible victims and possible beneficiaries also vote.
Now notice: If we examine the changes over time in who the voters should be, we will see a very close relationship with the change in political philosophy as well as the change in technology. This means the general election we have in this era, the universal suffrage we have, was not precisely possible even 200/300 years ago; it is not possible without the communication technology of this era. This means that in the former era, scholars (in reality, only those scholars connected to the policy makers/court!) voted on Ilm, but they had to remain unaware of possible victims and beneficiaries, relying on speculation, because the people were not getting the opportunity to speak up for themselves, and even if they wanted to, it was not possible to give them that opportunity.
For these reasons, in my estimation, the voting/election of this era is not opposed to the former era, there is no hostility; rather, it is an improvement, the core value is the same. The opinions of more scholars (countless scholars both for and against the power), possible victims, and beneficiaries can also be taken.
Now we need to see how much this applies to the individual candidate, if it is so for policy/Fatwa.
To address this question, let me raise another question first—Can an individual Taghut be a candidate in an election? The answer is no. Because no one can be a candidate themselves—another person must propose them; the Shirk inherent in the idea of Taghut—claiming oneself to be God—does not lend itself to such a relative act. Taghut means the claim of absolute sovereignty, as Nimrod was.
So, to enter the democratic system, it is seen that the matter of not being a Taghut is present right at the root! Then look, it is not enough for someone to propose a person; a committee of scholars first certifies them as a candidate. That is, there are laws to verify whether someone is fit to be a candidate; many individuals and institutions must grant clearance—from medical clearance to corruption checks and banking records. Overcoming all these obstacles, we get a few capable individuals as candidates, and the public, through election, chooses or grants the authority to rule to the most capable person, in their judgment, among a group of capable individuals.
Next, consider the modern media, including the current social media. Ultimately, the vote is not given to the individual but to their policy-ideas-manifesto. Public scholars across the country and institutional scholars discuss and judge a candidate’s manifesto and track record, presenting their judgment to the public.
In this era of intense division of labor, the types of Ilm are countless, and thus there are thousands of types of scholars. While scholars are as engaged in the practice of thought and Ilm as they can be, the majority of people in society and the state cannot devote enough time to thought—some grow grain, some attach screws to mobile phones, some fish, some provide internet by repairing fiber optic cables, and some cut grass for a goat that has just given birth. While these large numbers of people cannot devote much time to thought, they understand their own profit and loss and are negatively or positively affected by a state policy. How do they vote for a policy?
This is where the duty and value of media and scholars lie; scholars, spending a lot of time on thought, create small tutorials for the general public and inform them of their judgment; the general public then makes their decision based on trust in certain scholars.
Therefore, an election is ultimately a fight between various schools of scholars and Ilm, and the school of Ilm that can convince the most people and gain their acceptance wins the election. This means a debate between thought and Ilm occurs among the scholars in an election, and the general public gives their acceptance to a certain school of Ilm. This is why the freedom of conscience is needed from state power, and the freedom of media is needed for scholars and Ilm to reach the public forum; the more the debate between scholars and Ilm, and the more the media takes that debate to the public forum, the closer the public can get to making the right decision.
The acceptance of the public is valuable; even the acceptance of the foolish is valuable. Otherwise, we would sanction a religion coercively taking over the foolish, putting them in chains of servitude! The acceptance of the foolish is also valuable because they too have joy and sorrow, and the joy of a foolish person is joy just like the joy of a scholar/clever person; a foolish person also leads a human life in the world, and we do not find any news of a deficit in God’s love for the foolish!
Since human Ilm is not divine, it is merely a possibility and therefore needs to be term-bound. When it tries not to be term-bound, when humans begin to think of their Ilm or judgment as permanent, Shirk occurs, and they become Taghut. Election is a process that keeps human Ilm/judgment as a draft or covenant, preventing it from becoming permanent by keeping it term-bound, and thus preventing humans from becoming Taghut! Conversely, since the ultimate fight in an election is between many schools of Ilm, and because not anyone can become a candidate (they must pass through many departments of Ilm and scholars to be deemed capable of ruling), and because after being elected they have to work within the framework of duty, the laws of the weak’s rights, and the basics of justice, a powerful barrier exists in this era against the emergence of the majoritarian tyrant/Taghut warned against in the Greek-Roman caution.
#RokomShahErFoishala #14May-12Jun2025
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